In addition to existing value chain and state based arrangements, there are a number of market-based governance arrangements in other fisheries and resource sectors that are relevant for tuna in the Coral Triangle and Western Pacific.
Market-based governance for fisheries include mechanisms that financially reward or "incentivize‟ resource users for improving their fishing practices; either by reducing pressure on vulnerable yellowfin and bigeye tuna stocks, or reducing the high by-catch rates of, amongst other species, juveniles of these tunas around FADs. A common examples of such systems for fisheries include individual transferable quotas (ITQs), but such a system is not deemed viable in the case of tuna due to the lack of surveillance capacity and the highly migratory nature of the stocks.
However, there are a range of alternative incentive-based systems operating in other fisheries around the world. The PNA countries already have a vessel day scheme in place which is designed to manage effort of tuna fisheries. But at lower scales other systems might also be relevant, including the notion of a "credit‟ like system for rewarding self-regulation of effort on juvenile stocks (as seen in Scottish cod fisheries), or technology swaps for reductions in juvenile by-catch (as already trialled in tuna fisheries in Japan). This sub-project is therefore interested in understanding the current application of market-based approaches to resource governance and their applicability to incentivizing innovations in tuna fishing practices that reduce pressure on (juvenile) bigeye and yellowfin tuna.
Furthermore, we are interested in applying this knowledge in modeling institutional design, regulation, market dynamics and ultimately impact on tuna fishery resources in the region.